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Sir,
Julien Hofman’s interesting article ‘The Moving Finger: 
SMS, On-Line Communication and On-Line Disinhibition’ 
(Volume 8, 2011, pp179-183) draws salutary attention to 
the risks of a hasty but valid resignation from employment 
effected by the sending of an SMS message.
The applicable law (that of South Africa) requires such a 
resignation to be in writing. That requirement was held 
to be satisfied by an SMS message by reason of a broad 
statutory provision, based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce, which provides that a requirement 
for writing is satisfied by a data message which is 
accessible for subsequent reference.
Mr Hofman draws attention to the different approach 
adopted by the UK Electronic Communications Act 2000. 
He commends its approach of enabling Ministers to make 
specific provision for different cases through the exercise 
of policy discretion, which he contrasts favourably 
with the more sweeping approach of the South African 
legislation.
Mr Hofman’s readers might incidentally be led to suppose 
that the UK legislation operated against a background in 
which electronic communications were not to be treated 
as being in writing unless Ministers had provided that 
this should be their effect. As that is not the case, I hope 
you will allow me space to correct any misunderstanding 
which may have arisen.
United Kingdom law has very few requirements for writing 
(and as it happens they do not include resignations 
from employment). The main ones are for dealings with 
interests in land, for guarantees and for consumer credit 
documentation. The field was reviewed comprehensively 
by the Law Commission, which in December 2001 
published Electronic Commerce: Formal Requirements 
in Commercial Transactions – Advice from the Law 
Commission. (Available from http://lawcommission.
justice.gov.uk/publications/795.htm)
The Law Commission’s Advice deserves reading in 
full, and no summary from me could replace it, but at 
the risk of considerable over-simplification I think the 
Commission’s view of what amounts to writing could 
be represented by the maxim, ‘If you can read it, it’s 
in writing.’ At para 3.42 the Advice summarises two 
conclusions:
(1) E-mails (and attachments) and website trading are 
capable of satisfying a writing requirement, but EDI is 
not.
(2) Digital signatures, scanned manuscript signatures, 
typing one’s name (or initials) and clicking on a 
website button are all methods of signature which are 
capable of satisfying a signature requirement.
At para 3.43 the Advice continues:
‘We have acknowledged above that, to date, there 
has been some lack of consensus on these issues. We 
hope that our analysis will prove convincing and that 
past doubts will be replaced by common agreement.’
I have followed this subject with considerable interest 
since 2001, and in my view the hope modestly expressed 
by the Law Commission has been amply fulfilled. There 
is no longer any material doubt that an electronic 
communication (including an SMS message) is in writing.
The result is that the Ministerial powers granted by the 
Electronic Communications Act 2000 to which Mr Hofman 
draws attention are not needed to enable electronic 
communications to satisfy a requirement for writing (and 
have not been used for that purpose).
Having differed from Mr Hofman about the implications 
of the UK legislation, I should perhaps add that I 
entirely accept that the modern explosion of electronic 
communications has widespread social implications. I 
welcome Mr Hofman’s contribution to working them out.
Yours truly,
Nicholas Bohm
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